Abstract Philisophical Nonsense...!

[simonm]

Kedaman

What's the use of having only false and potentially true statements? For logic to be applied you need axiomatic approaches. Besides, isn't it possible that a falsified statement can be reverted to potentially true, since observational evidence doesn't justify anything?

OK, according to Popper, the purpose of science is to weed out the false theories (from an array of conjectured hypothesis) and from those left, select the best one. Eventually, you end up with the best available theory and go with that. The benefit of not having actually true theories is that you keep things open to revision. You acknowledge the fact that one day a new and better theory may come along and usurp the previously held one.

The reason why observational evidence doesn't justify anything is, not because it might be erroneous (although that is a valid point in itself), but because any finite collection of observations may be consistant with an infinite number of potential theories.

Assuming that an observation is valid, if it does not falsify your particular theory, it doesn't mean that your theory is in anyway justified. There are an infinite number of other theories that would also not be falsified by this observation.

That is why an observation can falsify but not confirm a theory.

Isn't that a bit how inductionists think? Why does the event of falsification become less probable if you have more correct applications of your statement?

I was refering to non-generalisation statements (such as "there is a chair in the den") which can be confirmed by observation.

[kedaman]

Simon
If there's two sets of statements, one with falsified, one with potentially true statements. When to extend the potentially true set with another statement is it more important that it is consistent with earlier potentially true statements or more important that it is consistent with observations?

[simonm]

Kedaman
If you have a theory that has not yet been falsified and you wish to extend it by adding additional assertions, the new statement(s) should be consistant with both previous statements and observations.

If a theory contains two statements that predict contrary observations, one of them will be falsified when tested, right?

[kedaman]

Simon
not sure how you can have such a theory, I wasn't actually talking about that, I was refering to the set of all statements that still are potentially true, they can be inconsistent with each other right? I think a theory would have to be selfconsistent while two theories can predict contradictory observations while being potentially true, am I right?

[simonm]

Kedaman

I think a theory would have to be selfconsistent while two theories can predict contradictory observations while being potentially true, am I right?

I suppose that is correct but a scientist would endeavour to test these conflicting theories until one or the other was falsified.